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iABSTRACT
Fermi barrels are 55-gallon drums that once contained bulk sodium metal from the shutdown
Fermi 1 breeder reactor facility, and now contain residual sodium metal and other sodium/air reaction
products. This report provides a residual sodium treatment method and proposed quality assurance steps
that will ensure that all residual sodium is deactivated and removed from the Fermi barrels before
disposal. The treatment method is the application of humidified carbon dioxide to the residual sodium
followed by a water wash. The experimental application of the treatment method to six Fermi barrels is
discussed, and recommendations are provided for further testing and evaluation of the method. Though
more testing would allow for a greater refinement of the treatment technique, enough data has been
gathered from the tests already performed to prove that 100% compliance with stated waste criteria can be
achieved.
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1Treatment Method for Fermi Barrel Sodium Residues
1. INTRODUCTION
The Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant
was a sodium metal-cooled 430 MWth reactor
that operated from 1963 to 1972. After the
reactor was permanently shut down in 1972, the
primary sodium metal coolant was drained from
the nuclear reactor into 55-gallon (208-liter)
steel barrels. In total, 77,000 gallons (291,000
liters) were drained from the reactor into
approximately 1400 barrels. The barrels were
shipped to Argonne National Laboratory – West
(ANL-W) in the early 1970’s for treatment.
Subsequently, during the execution of the
Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) Plant
Closure Project (active between 1999 and 2002),
the sodium metal was drained from the barrels
and processed into 73 wt% sodium hydroxide in
the ANL-W Sodium Processing Facility (SPF).
After the draining process was completed,
approximately 2.5 lbs (1.1 kg) of residual
sodium metal remained in each of the barrels.
The barrels were sealed with a nitrogen cover
gas and placed into storage in cargo containers
that hold approximately 80 barrels in each
container. The cargo containers are now stored
within the boundaries of the Materials and Fuels
Complex (MFC) of the Idaho National
Laboratory (INL), formerly known as ANL-W.
These barrels meet the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) definition of an
empty container and are not regulated as
hazardous waste.
Although considered empty by RCRA
standards, the State of Idaho has different
regulations and still considers the barrels solid
waste. Storage, handling, and disposal of the
barrels must meet State of Idaho code for
protection of human health and the environment.
Additionally, the barrels are considered low
level radioactive waste because of their origin
and measurable radioactive content and must be
disposed according to the waste acceptance
criteria for the Radioactive Waste Management
Complex (RWMC) in southeastern Idaho or
other equivalent facility.
Safe storage of the Fermi barrels, when
full and “empty”, has been achieved for many
years with no incident, but continued storage of
the barrels likely cannot be achieved for an
indefinite amount of time without further
attention from the State of Idaho and the
Laboratory. The barrels are an environmental
liability and offer a small but finite safety risk.
The sodium metal remaining in the barrels is
chemically active and can react under the right
environmental conditions (e.g, water in-leakage)
to release hydrogen gas and heat.
The best way to eliminate the
environmental and safety risks offered by these
barrels is to treat and dispose the barrels. As a
part of this process, all residual sodium metal in
the barrels must be deactivated or removed
because the waste disposal sites cannot accept
any chemically reactive metals, including
sodium, in their waste streams.
This report provides a residual sodium
treatment method and proposed quality
assurance steps that will ensure that all residual
sodium is deactivated and removed from the
Fermi barrels before disposal. The treatment
method is the application of humidified carbon
dioxide to the residual sodium (Sherman et al.,
2002; Sherman, 2005) followed by a water
wash. The experimental application of the
treatment method to six Fermi barrels is
discussed, and recommendations are provided
for further testing and evaluation of the method.
Though more testing would allow for a greater
refinement of the treatment technique, enough
data has been gathered from the tests already
performed to prove that 100% compliance with
stated waste criteria can be achieved.
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32. PROPOSED TREATMENT
METHOD
All of the drained Fermi barrels located at
the INL’s Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC)
are known to contain less than 5 lbs (2.25 kg) of
residual sodium metal, which is below the 10-lb
threshold above which the barrels would be
regulated under the Resource Conservation
Recovery Act (RCRA) statues. The exact
amount of residual sodium in each barrel is
unknown, however, because the barrels also
contain a mixture of sodium oxides, sodium
hydroxides, and sodium carbonates. Over time,
air and water has leaked into the barrels to react
some of the residual sodium and convert it into
these other materials. Figure 1 shows a
photograph of the inside of one of the drained
Fermi barrels.
Figure 1: Barrel #ANL1174 before treatment
In the figure, residual sodium metal isn’t visible
because it is coated with other materials. The
residual materials adhere to the barrel walls and
the bottom with very little loose material.
Any treatment method for the Fermi
barrels must be able to penetrate the layers of
obstructing material to deactivate the sodium
metal underneath. Also, the method must be
capable of reacting the entire mass of residual
sodium within each drum (10 lbs or less) in a
reasonable amount of time and with an
acceptable level of safety and cost. The waste
products generated by the treatment process
must be compatible with the waste criteria for
the chosen disposal site.
Two engineering evaluations were
written to determine the best treatment method
for these barrels. The first engineering
evaluation (ETA EB-2001-014) recommended
that the barrels be treated with steam or
superheated steam and nitrogen, with the
resultant caustic waste products being processed
through the MFC’s Sodium Processing Facility
(SPF). With the steam and nitrogen process,
residual sodium is reacted with steam to form
liquid and solid solutions of hydrated sodium
hydroxide. The nitrogen is provided to dilute
the hydrogen gas generated by the water-sodium
reaction and to displace any oxygen that might
leak into the treatment process. After treatment,
the caustic waste products would become part of
the overall sodium hydroxide waste stream from
the plant, and the barrels themselves would be
crushed and disposed as scrap metal.
Since that evaluation was written, the
SPF was placed into a stand-by condition and is
no longer staffed. The SPF may be re-opened at
some point if sodium metal from the Fast Flux
Test Facility (FFTF) is shipped to the MFC for
processing, but the certainty and time line on
this activity are unknown, and it was decided not
to pursue a treatment method that had an
uncertain waste disposition pathway. Also,
opening the SPF just to process the relatively
small volume of waste materials that would be
generated by the steam and nitrogen process
would be cost-prohibitive.
A second engineering evaluation was
written (ETA EB-2004-002) to re-examine the
treatment options for the Fermi barrels, and a
different treatment technique was recommended.
This evaluation advocated the application of
humidified carbon dioxide to deactivate the
residual sodium in the Fermi barrels, the same
technique that was used to treat residual sodium
within the Experimental Breeder Reactor II
(EBR-II) secondary sodium cooling system and
is still being used to deactivate residual sodium
within the EBR-II primary sodium system
4(Sherman et al., 2002). Using this technique,
the residual sodium metal within the barrels
would be converted into sodium bicarbonate.
Previous experience has shown that sodium
metal up to 5-7 cm in depth can be reacted
completely with this technique in a reasonable
amount of time (120 days or less), and that the
waste products are solid sodium carbonates,
which are permissible for disposal in the chosen
waste sites. The treatment process operates
safely with a minimum of staffing, and has a low
operating cost.
This section describes the particular
application of humidified carbon dioxide to the
Fermi barrels, along with adaptations made to
the treatment process to ensure adequate safety
and treatment effectiveness. The treatment steps
are described below.
2.1 Treatment Steps
The treatment of the Fermi barrels takes
place in three stages. The first stage is the
exposure of the Fermi barrels to humidified
carbon dioxide in order to completely convert
the residual sodium metal and waste sodium
oxides and sodium hydroxide into sodium
carbonates. The second stage is a visual
inspection, followed by a water wash in the
Water Wash Vessel (WWV) at the Sodium
Component Maintenance Shop (SCMS), located
at the MFC. The third stage is a size reduction
step, where the Fermi barrels are crushed to
reduce their size, are placed into suitable waste
containers or overpacks, and are disposed.
2.1.1 Stage One: Reaction of
Residual Sodium
This stage is conducted in the Sodium
Boiler Building (SBB), which is part of the
EBR-II Facility at the MFC.
As a first step, one or more Fermi
barrels are connected in series to the Carbon
Dioxide Humidification cart, as shown in Figure
2. In a serial arrangement, the exhaust gases
from the first barrel in the series feed into the
second barrel, and so on until the end of the
chain. A serial arrangement allows for efficient
use of the moisture and carbon dioxide gas.
Although only 2 barrels have been tested in
series, it is presumed that longer treatment trains
of up to 10-20 barrels might be assembled
without suffering too great a pressure drop
across the barrel train, so that many barrels
might be treated at one time without having to
change out drums too frequently.
Figure 2. Carbon dioxide humidification cart
and Fermi Barrels in series
In the second step, the barrel train is
flushed with a mixture of argon gas and carbon
dioxide. The gas mixture is initially set at a ratio
of 10-to-1 argon to carbon dioxide, and then
gradually increased to a 4-to-1 ratio, and then to
pure carbon dioxide, in response to the measured
hydrogen concentration in the off-gas and the
measured temperature of the barrels. A gradual
approach is needed, because the barrels contain
sodium oxide in the surface layers, and sodium
oxide reacts readily with carbon dioxide,
resulting in the generation of heat and the
release of hydrogen gas through other indirect
chemical reactions.
Blending argon with carbon dioxide in
the initial stages increases process safety by
reducing the conversion rate of sodium oxide to
sodium carbonate, which will reduce the
temperature of the barrels during the initial gas
flush. If pure carbon dioxide is used during this
initial flush without blending it with argon,
5surface temperatures on the bottom of the
barrels, where the largest residual sodium
deposits are located, can climb as high as 300 ºC
for a period of 5 minutes or more as the sodium
oxide is converted into sodium carbonate.
Blending argon with carbon dioxide limits the
supply of carbon dioxide to the barrels and result
in lower barrel surface temperatures during this
initial flush. Blending argon with carbon
dioxide has an added safety benefit in that the
flow of carbon dioxide can be stopped altogether
at any time during the initial flush without
stopping the flow of inert flush gas through the
barrels.
In the third step, after all of the sodium
oxide has been converted into sodium carbonate
and the barrel temperatures have fallen to
ambient temperature, the flow of humidified
carbon dioxide is started in order to react the
residual sodium. This step requires some
physical manipulation of the barrels while the
residual sodium is being reacted. During this
step, the barrels are first treated in an upright
position, and are then placed on their sides in
drum racks, first on one side, and then the other
side by rotating the barrels by 180º. When the
barrels are lying on their sides, the bottom and
exposed sides of the barrels are occasionally
rapped with a rubber mallet in order to shake
loose adhering carbonate deposits. The method
is somewhat crude, but has been found to work
in early experiments (see Section 3). The
indication of when to flip the barrels onto their
sides, and then onto the opposite sides is
provided by the measured hydrogen
concentration in the off-gas. When the
measured hydrogen concentration decays to
background levels in the upright position, the
barrels are flipped to their sides. When the
measured hydrogen concentration decays again
to the background position, the barrels are
flipped or rotated to the opposite side.
Treatment with humidified carbon dioxide is
terminated when the measured hydrogen
concentration decays a final time to background
levels.
To summarize, this stage is performed in
three steps. These steps are:
1) Connect barrels to carbon dioxide
humidification cart in a serial
arrangement.
2) Flush barrels with argon/carbon dioxide
blend with a gradual change to a pure
carbon dioxide flush in order to react
sodium oxide within the barrels.
3) React residual sodium with humidified
carbon dioxide until completion.
2.1.2 Stage Two: Visual Inspection
and Water Wash
This stage is performed in the Sodium
Component Maintenance Shop (SCMS) at the
MFC.
Inside the Water Wash Vessel tent, the
barrels are individually flushed with argon gas,
and are then cut in two pieces at the barrel
centerline halfway between the top and the
bottom of the barrels. The two barrel pieces are
separated and inspected for residual sodium
deposits. The bottom half of the barrels will
contain loose sodium carbonate materials, which
are poured or scooped out of the bottom into a
suitable waste container to facilitate the visual
inspection and to reduce the waste material load
in the barrels. Results of the visual inspection
are recorded for later evaluation.
Following the visual inspection, the
barrel halves are placed into the Water Wash
Vessel and are water washed using the generally
accepted SCMS facility procedures for washing
any sodium-containing parts or components.
Water washing the barrel halves completely
removes any adhering carbonate materials from
the walls of the barrels, and will react any
residual sodium remaining in the barrels if it is
present.
Barrel halves are inspected after
emerging from the Water Wash Vessel to ensure
complete treatment. If any residual sodium
metal remains in the drum halves after being in
the Water Wash Vessel, the drum halves are set
aside for further treatment, which may include
another water wash.
6Periodic replacement of the Water Wash
Vessel liquid will need to be performed once the
water wash liquid becomes saturated with
sodium carbonates and sodium hydroxide
materials from the barrel halves. Spent water
wash liquid will be solidified by mixing it with
Aquaset in waste drums and disposed as low-
level radioactive waste (LLW) at RWMC or
another approved waste site.
2.1.3 Stage Three: Size Reduction
The third stage is size reduction of the
barrel halves. The barrel halves are to be
crushed in a drum crusher installed in the
SCMS. Once crushed, the scrap metal will be
placed into overpacks and disposed.
2.2 Quality Assurance
The proposed treatment method described
above must ensure that 100% of the treated
barrels or barrel halves contain no residual
sodium metal. Assurance of this fact is provided
by Stage Two of the treatment process: visual
inspection of the barrel halves followed by a
water wash.
From the early tests tests, it was learned
that residual sodium deposits, when present, are
easily spotted during the visual inspection step
because of their distinct physical form. The
deposits are metallic gray in appearance and
tend to adhere strongly to the sides or bottom of
the barrels. When probed with a tool, the
deposits are soft and wax-like, and retain the
physical characteristics of pure sodium metal.
Carbonate deposits, unlike residual sodium, do
not adhere strongly to the sides or bottom of the
barrels, are mechanically brittle, and are white in
color. Once all of the loose material has been
removed from the barrel halves during the
inspection, any remaining deposits of material
can be probed to determine whether the deposit
is residual sodium metal or adhering carbonate.
Since there is little operating experience
with this proposed treatment method, all of the
barrels after the visual inspection are water
washed, regardless of the visual inspection
results. Water washing has been shown to be
100% effective in removing all residual sodium
metal, sodium hydroxide, and sodium carbonate
materials from the inside of the barrels. After
the barrel halves are water washed, the inside of
the barrels are clean, and polished metal can be
seen at all points.
At some point in the future, after more
operating experience has been collected (perhaps
after processing the first 100-200 Fermi barrels),
water washing of all Fermi barrels might be
eliminated in the interest of cost savings and
efficiency. Visual inspection results will be
recorded for all barrels, and the presence or
absence of residual sodium after the humid
carbon dioxide treatment will be recorded. If it
is established that the visual inspection step is
100% effective in distinguishing between barrel
halves that contain residual sodium and those
that do not, as indicated by the generation of
hydrogen in the Water Wash Vessel during the
water wash step, then perhaps only those barrels
failing the visual inspection might be water
washed. The barrel halves not water washed
can be sent directly to the drum crusher for size
reduction without washing, since sodium
bicarbonate and sodium carbonate are allowed
for disposal at most LLW disposal sites.
73. FERMI BARREL
TREATMENT
EXPERIMENTS
During the development process, six
Fermi barrels were treated with humidified
carbon dioxide. The first four barrels were
treated individually, one at a time, while the last
two were treated simultaneously in a serial
barrel arrangement. A summary of
observations and results obtained for each barrel
are presented in tabular form. After the
summary of results, more in-depth explanation
of the treatment process and results obtained for
each barrel is given, since the total number of
barrels treated during this initial development
period is relatively small.
3.1 Summary of Treatment
Results
Table 1 summarizes the observations and
results obtained from treating six Fermi Barrels.
These barrels (in order of treatment) are labeled
ANL#82, 630, 1128, 1174, 1135, and 1116.
Table 1: Fermi Barrel Treatment Summary
# Init.
Temp
Rise
ºC
Mech.
Agit.?
Zero
H2?
Na
Pre-
Wash?
Na
Post-
Wash?
82 Yes No No Yes No
630 120 Yes Yes No No
1128 110 Yes Yes Yes No
1174 40 Yes Yes No No
1135 300 Yes Yes No No
1116 220 Yes Yes No No
In the table, the # sign indicates the barrel
number. The column heading “Init. Temp. Rise
ºC” shows the highest recorded temperature on
the bottom of the barrel upon introduction of dry
carbon dioxide to the barrel. The “Mech.
Agit.?” column indicates whether the barrel was
tipped and periodically agitated with a rubber
mallet as described in Section 2, or whether the
barrel remained in an upright position and was
not agitated. The “Zero H2?” heading shows
whether the measured hydrogen concentration
during treatment was allowed to fall to zero
offset from background during the treatment
process. The “Na Pre-Wash?” column asks
whether metallic sodium was seen in the barrel
prior to the water wash step. The “Na Post-
Wash?” column shows whether metallic sodium
remained in the barrel after the water wash step.
The most striking observation during the
treatment of these drums was the large short-
term temperature increase caused by the
introduction of dry carbon dioxide. All of the
barrels experienced a temperature increase to
some degree, with three of the barrels heating to
a high enough temperature (ANL#82, 1135, and
1116) to cause smoke to rise from the barrel
bottoms. The paint on the barrels did not blister
or change its appearance, so it is presumed that
the smoke arose from grease or other
contaminants on the barrel surface. The
temperature rose quickly, usually within the first
few minutes, stayed at or near the high
temperature for several minutes, and then
decayed in an exponential manner back down to
ambient temperature in all cases. The initial
temperature spike is presumably from the
reaction of carbon dioxide with sodium oxide.
The carbon dioxide-sodium oxide reaction is
very energetic, and is most likely responsible for
the initial high temperatures. Since the supply
of carbon dioxide is essentially unlimited, the
sodium oxide can react as quickly as the
diffusion of carbon dioxide through the solid
surface layers will allow.
The large temperature spike was
accompanied by a spike in the measured
hydrogen concentration. For barrels ANL#630,
1128, 1174, 1135, and 1116, hydrogen
concentration in the off-gas exceeded 4 vol% for
a time span nearly equivalent to the time span of
8the maximum temperature. The rise in
hydrogen concentration was accompanied by an
increase in the measured oxygen concentration
above 1 vol%. The peak height above 1 vol%
was not recorded because 1 vol% was the upper
threshold for the recorded signal, but in one case
it was observed that the oxygen concentration
did not exceed 1.6 vol%, based on a visual
observation of the oxygen meter readout itself.
Since hydrogen can only come from the reaction
of water vapor with sodium metal, the reaction
of carbon dioxide with sodium oxide must
directly or indirectly cause a release of captured
water from the oxide/carbonate crust within the
barrels, which in turn reacts with sodium metal
to create hydrogen. The hydrogen spike
subsided with the subsidence of the drum
temperature, and quickly fell to background
levels as the barrels began to cool to ambient
temperature.
In an effort to decrease the initial
temperature rise, the carbon dioxide will be
blended with argon gas during the initial barrel
flush for subsequent barrels. Blending carbon
dioxide with argon will reduce the supply of
carbon dioxide within the barrel to the point
where the chemical reaction is carbon dioxide
limited rather than sodium oxide limited.
Making the reaction carbon dioxide limited will
make it more controllable, because the blend of
carbon dioxide with argon can be easily adjusted
to increase or decrease the reaction rate, whereas
there is no control over the amount of sodium
oxide within each barrel.
After the initial temperature spike and
its subsidence, the treatment process operated as
expected, and behaved in a manner that was
consistent with the application of humidified
carbon dioxide to sodium in the laboratory, and
within the EBR-II secondary and primary
sodium systems. The treatment process ran
smoothly, and no safety problems were
encountered. The bottom of the barrels tended
to warm slightly to about 5ºC above ambient
temperature as the sodium reacted with the
humidified carbon dioxide, but no smoke was
generated, and the drum surfaces were safe to
touch by hand.
The best treatment results were obtained
by a multi-step treatment process. First, the
barrel is placed in an upright position and
reacted with humidified carbon dioxide until the
measured hydrogen concentration falls to
background level. Then, the barrel is tipped 90º
on its side and reacted again with humidified
carbon dioxide. The barrel is occasionally
rapped on the sides and the bottom of the barrel
(i.e., “mechanical agitation”) in order loosen
adhering carbonate materials and expose fresh
metallic sodium. Once the measured hydrogen
concentration falls again to background levels,
the barrel is rotated by 180º in the opposite
direction, and exposed again to humidified
carbon dioxide while the barrel is occasionally
rapped with a rubber mallet. The barrel is then
removed to the Sodium Component
Maintenance Shop where the drum is cut in half,
separating the top and bottom halves of the
drum, and the loose carbonate material is
removed from the barrel. The barrel is
inspected, and then water washed.
Mechanical agitation and rotation of the
barrels was deemed to be a very important step
in the treatment process. Barrel ANL#82 was
not tipped and agitated, and a large amount of
sodium (1-2 lbs) remained in the barrel after it
appeared that very little hydrogen (less than 0.3
vol%) was still being generated. This sodium
could not be effectively treated with humidified
carbon dioxide, because it had been buried under
a thick layer of carbonate powder. Though the
humidified carbon dioxide could still penetrate
the layer of loose material, the diffusion rate was
very slow and the sodium could not be reacted
completely in a reasonable amount of time (1
week or less). Tipping the barrel and agitating
causes the loose material to slough away from
the metallic sodium underneath and more clearly
exposes the sodium to the humidified carbon
dioxide.
Barrel ANL#1128 was tipped and
agitated, but still contained metallic sodium at
the end of humidified carbon dioxide treatment.
The metallic sodium was covered by a harder
layer of carbonate material that did not slump
when the barrel was tipped. It was believed that
9this barrel is an exception, and that such
exceptions in the future will be easily spotted
and set aside for further treatment during the
visual inspection step.
Overall, assuming the drums selected
for these tests are representative of the whole,
the sodium in a single barrel can be reacted in
just about 1 week or less. A serial arrangement
of the barrels, where the exhaust gas from one
barrel flows into the next barrel, will be needed
to increase the overall treatment rate.
In all cases, the visual inspection step
provided clear evidence whether there still
remained metallic sodium in the bottom of the
barrels. When the barrels had sodium in them,
the deposits tended to be large and easily
distinguishable from the white, powdery
carbonate material generated by the treatment
process. When the barrels had no sodium in
them, bottom of the barrels were clearly visible,
even in the seam that joins the sides of the barrel
with the bottom.
The water wash step was 100% effective
in removing everything from the barrels,
whether there was sodium metal in the barrels or
only adhering carbonate material. After the
water wash step was completed, the sides and
bottom of the barrels were shiny and metallic,
and no corrosion was seen inside the barrels.
The barrel crusher was not yet in
operation at the time these experiments were
performed, and so no Fermi barrels have yet
been crushed.
3.2 Barrel ANL#82
Prior to flushing the barrel with dry
carbon dioxide, the barrel was “sniffed” with a
portable hydrogen detector in order to make sure
that the barrel could be safely opened in air with
no risk of a hydrogen combustion event. The
portable detector detected an initial hydrogen
reading of 1200 ppm hydrogen, which then
decayed to 0 ppm hydrogen after a couple of
minutes. The presence of hydrogen indicated
that water had leaked into the barrel at some
point in the past and reacted with sodium metal.
Upon initial carbon dioxide introduction,
the barrel experienced an increase in drum
temperature after a quite period of about five
minutes. The barrel was not instrumented for
temperature, and the only indication of high
temperature was the smell of smoke and the
feeling that the drum surfaces were hot to the
touch. The hydrogen and oxygen meters were
not operational at the moment the carbon
dioxide flush began, and no measurements of
hydrogen and oxygen in the off-gas were
obtained. The drum was allowed to cool before
proceeding with the humidified carbon dioxide
treatment.
The barrel was exposed to carbon dioxide
from 9/28/2004 14:50 until 10/19/2004 9:15 at a
rate of 5 scfm. During the first 15 days, the use
of moisture was restricted to the day shift during
the regular work days only (no weekend days).
For the remaining 6 days, the barrel was allowed
to react continuously. Figure 3 shows the
recorded traces of the hydrogen and oxygen
concentration in the barrel off-gas during this
time period.
Figure 3: ANL#82 H2 and O2 Concentrations
In the figure, there are two large spikes in the
hydrogen and oxygen concentration. These
spikes were not a result of physical events
within the barrel, but were related to two
instrument calibrations that were performed
during the test and are an artifact of those
calibrations.
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Due to the erratic nature of the treatment
operation, the uncertainty regarding the amount
of residual sodium in the barrel at the start of the
process, and the lack of a defined end point in
regard to the measured hydrogen concentration,
it was decided to terminate the use of humidified
carbon dioxide after 21 days and examine the
inside of the barrel. A visual examination
showed that the barrel contained more than one
gallon of loose white powder and there still
remained a ring of unreacted metallic sodium
around the bottom rim of the barrel. In total, it
was estimated that approximately 1-2 lbs of
sodium was not reacted. Figure 4 shows the ring
of metallic sodium at the bottom of the barrel.
Figure 4. ANL#82 with sodium remaining.
The white powder was analyzed in the
analytical laboratory by X-ray diffraction and
acid-base titration, and was found to be about
70% sodium bicarbonate and about 30% sodium
carbonate.
Aside from the white powder and the
metallic sodium, there appeared to be black
flecks of material mixed in with the carbonate
powder generated by the treatment process.
Figure 5 shows these black flecks. These black
flecks were analyzed and were found to be
mostly sulfur mixed with iron. It is believed that
the black flecks came from contamination that
was internal to the barrel at the time the barrels
were filled with bulk sodium and were not a
result of the barrel treatment process.
Figure 5. Black material from ANL#82.
Physical removal of the residual sodium
was attempted at SCMS by cutting the barrel
sides at about 1 foot above the bottom of the
barrel, so that workers could easily reach the
metallic sodium and scrape it out with a tool.
This proved to be somewhat hazardous because
it was difficult to maintain a good argon blanket
on such a short-walled vessel and the physical
removal of the sodium was abandoned for
chemical removal the Water Wash Vessel at
SCMS. After washing, the barrel pieces
emerged clean and free of any adhering sodium
or carbonate materials.
3.3 Barrel ANL#630
No hydrogen was found in Barrel
ANL#630 with the portable hydrogen monitor
when the barrel bungs were first opened.
Before the initial carbon dioxide purge,
the hydrogen and oxygen monitors on the vent
line were verified to be in working order, and
additional temperature probes were installed on
the outer surface of the barrel.
At 11/02/2004 8:42, the barrel was
flushed with dry carbon dioxide at 5 scfm and
ambient temperature. When the carbon dioxide
flush began, the temperature of the drum
remained steady for several minutes, and then
11
climbed quickly to a maximum of 120 ºC. The
temperature remained near the maximum
temperature for several more minutes, and then
began an exponential decay back to ambient
temperature. Full cooldown of the barrel took
almost 1 hour.
The spike in the barrel temperature,
especially at the bottom where the highest
temperature was recorded, was correlated with
increases in the measured hydrogen and oxygen
concentrations in the barrel off-gas. Figure 6
shows the measured hydrogen and oxygen
concentrations for a half-hour period covering
the temperature spike.
Figure 6. ANL#630 H2 and O2 concentrations
during the initial CO2 purge
In the figure, oxygen reaches its highest
detectable level (1 vol%) first at about 6
minutes, and then hydrogen rises quickly to
beyond 5 vol% for short period of time. There is
also a sudden rise in the oxygen concentration at
about 25 minutes, but the origin of this rise is
unknown, and the high oxygen level was not
sustained.
After eliminating air leaks as a cause,
the most likely source for the oxygen during the
purge is the reaction of water with sodium
peroxide. Oxygen is generated by the reaction
of sodium peroxide (Na2O2) with water. The
formation of sodium peroxide, it is believed
(Foust, 1972), requires that sodium above the
temperature of 150-200 ºC be exposed to air or
oxygen. So, if sodium peroxide is present, then
such exposure could have only occurred when
the barrels were initially filled with molten
sodium, or when the barrels were drained of
bulk sodium at SPF. No chemical analyses of
the residual sodium oxide residues inside the
barrel were performed, so it could not be
verified that sodium peroxide was the cause.
Figure 7. #ANL630 H2 and O2 concentrations
during humidified CO2 treatment
From 11/02/2004 9:00 through
11/11/2004 9:45, the barrel was treated with
humidified carbon dioxide at a rate of 5 scfm
and at ambient temperature. Figure 7 shows the
measured hydrogen and oxygen concentrations
during humidified carbon dioxide treatment of
the barrel. Starting from the left hand side of the
figure, the initial drop in hydrogen occurred
when the barrel was in an upright position. The
rise in the curve at Day 1 and the subsequent
drop corresponds to when the drum was placed
on its side and mechanically agitated with a
rubber mallet. The large spike at Day 5 is
artificial, and corresponds to a kinked hose in
the barrel gas feed line, which stopped the flow
of humidified carbon dioxide into the barrel and
allowed air to infiltrate backward through the
vent to the H2 and O2 detectors. The short rise at
Day 6 and subsequent decay corresponds to a
rotation of the barrel to the opposite side, and
further mechanical agitation of the barrel.
Although the hydrogen concentration did not
decay to a true zero point, the trend in the
hydrogen concentration curve seemed to
indicated that there was no longer any sodium
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left to react, and treatment with humidified
carbon dioxide was terminated.
After completing the treatment step, the
barrel bungs were removed and photos were
taken of the barrel interior. Figure 8 shows one
photo taken just after the treatment step. The
bottom of the barrel is clearly visible with no
apparent ring of sodium around the barrel seams.
The white carbonate material was loose and
powdery, and had a flaky consistency.
Figure 8. ANL#630 after treatment with
humidified CO2
The barrel was moved to SCMS where
the top of the barrel was removed so that the
white material could be removed. No sodium
metal was seen during the inspection.
The barrel was washed in the Water Wash
Vessel, and no hydrogen was detected during the
washing.
3.4 Barrel ANL#1128
No hydrogen was found in Barrel
ANL#1128 with the portable hydrogen monitor
when the barrel bungs were first opened.
Before the initial carbon dioxide purge,
the hydrogen and oxygen monitors on the vent
line were verified to be in working order, and
additional temperature probes were installed on
the outer surface of the barrel.
At 11/11/2004 9:46, the barrel was first
flushed with dry carbon dioxide at 5 scfm and
ambient temperature. When the carbon dioxide
flush began, the temperature of the barrel bottom
rose immediately to 110 ºC. It remained at the
maximum temperature for approximately 5
minutes, and then cooled down. Figure 9 shows
the measured hydrogen and oxygen
concentrations during the initial purge.
Figure 9. #ANL1128 H2 and O2 concentrations
during initial dry CO2 purge
As was seen with Barrel #630, the hydrogen rose
quickly to above 5 vol%, and then began falling
within 10 minutes. The oxygen concentration
also increased during this time period to above 1
vol%, which was the maximum limit of the
oxygen sensor. The increase in oxygen readings
is consistent with the observed increase in
oxygen concentration during the initial purge of
Barrel #ANL630. The reaction of sodium
peroxide with water may indeed be the cause for
the increased oxygen.
Though the recorded oxygen level is
limited to a maximum of 1 vol%, observations
made at the time of the actual instrument read-
out showed that the oxygen level reached a peak
concentration of about 1.6 vol%. This is above
the action level of 1 vol%, but the action was to
purge with dry carbon dioxide, and so the purge
was continued. This increase in oxygen is a
concern when hydrogen and heat are also being
generated.
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Care must be taken during future drum
treatment tests to avoid creating conditions that
could lead to a hydrogen combustion event. The
conditions encountered during this barrel purge
were outside of the hydrogen flammable limit
(oxygen still too low) and so there was no
danger of a hydrogen fire here. However, if the
flow of fresh carbon dioxide were suddenly
reduced, then it may be possible to create
temporary conditions inside the barrel where the
hydrogen and oxygen are still being generated
but are not being purged from the barrel at a fast
enough rate. The carbon dioxide purge rate
needed to remain as fast as possible (here 5
scfm) to dilute the hydrogen and oxygen being
generated and keep the concentrations of gases
below the flammable limit. In the future, such
conditions might be better created by diluting
the carbon dioxide with another inert gas such as
argon. With less carbon dioxide present, the
reaction of carbon dioxide with sodium oxide or
sodium peroxide might be less vigorous, and the
argon would be there to dilute the hydrogen and
oxygen generated. Also, it would give operators
the opportunity to stop the flow rate altogether
of carbon dioxide will still maintaining an inert
gas purge. In that way, if the hydrogen and
oxygen concentrations approach the safety
limits, the flow of carbon dioxide could be
stopped while still maintaining a flow of inert
purge gas.
The use of humidified carbon dioxide
began at 11/11/2004 11:30 and continued until
11/22/2004 12:30. The gas flow rate was
maintained at 5 scfm for the entire time span.
The measured hydrogen and oxygen
concentration during this treatment period is
shown in Figure 10. The first peak on the
hydrogen curve corresponds to the reaction of
residual sodium with the barrel in the upright
position, while the second and third lesser peaks
in the hydrogen curve correspond to the barrel
positioned on its side. Treatment was
terminated when it appeared that the hydrogen
concentration had leveled off at background
levels.
Figure 10. H2 and O2 concentrations during
humidified CO2 treatment of ANL #1128
The barrel was visually inspected after
the humidified carbon dioxide treatment step,
and it was discovered that the bottom of the
barrel was covered by a large white deposit that
did not slump or move when the barrel was
rotated. A picture of this deposit at the bottom
of the barrel is shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11. Visual inspection of ANL#1128.
Upon additional investigation of the
deposit at SCMS, it was discovered that there
was a significant amount of metallic sodium
beneath the hard crusty layer of carbonate
material.
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The barrel was water washed, and no
sodium or carbonate material remained after the
water wash.
Although the use of humidified carbon
dioxide did not fully react all of the residual
sodium within the barrel, the results were
encouraging in that the morphology of the
deposit at the bottom of the barrel could be
distinguished easily from the morphology of the
deposit at the bottom of Barrel #630, the
previous barrel treated. While in #630 the
material at the bottom was loose and flaky, the
material in #1128 was not flaky and stayed in
place when the barrel was rolled side to side.
This result indicated that perhaps the visual
inspection step might be used in the future to
distinguish between barrels that may require a
water wash from those that do not.
3.5 Barrel ANL#1174
No hydrogen was found in Barrel
ANL#1174 with the portable hydrogen monitor
when the barrel bungs were first opened.
Before the initial carbon dioxide purge,
the hydrogen and oxygen monitors on the vent
line were verified to be in working order, and
additional temperature probes were installed on
the outer surface of the barrel.
From 11/22/2004 12:30 to 11/22/2004 14:30, the
barrel was flushed with dry carbon dioxide.
Figure 12 shows the measured hydrogen and
oxygen curves for the first 10 minutes of this
purge period. During the purge, the barrel
experienced a temperature rise, but only to a
maximum of 40 ºC, and no smoke was
generated. During this purge, the width of the
oxygen peak was wider than the width of the
hydrogen peak.
Figure 12. ANL#1174 measured H2 and O2
concentration during initial CO2 purge
Treatment of ANL#1174 with humidified
carbon dioxide began at 11/22/2004 14:30 and
was completed at 12/1/2004 10:00. Figure 13
shows the measured hydrogen and oxygen
concentrations for the first 3.5 days of treatment.
Figure 13. ANL#1174 measured H2 and O2
concentrations during treatment with humidified
CO2
In the figure, the barrel was reacted in a vertical
position for just under 2 days, and then was
placed on its side for further treatment. The first
peak on the left (and the subsequent decay)
correspond to the hydrogen generated while the
drum was in a vertical position, and the short
peak just before Day 2 corresponds to when it
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was flipped on its side for the first time. There
was no measured peak for the second side
rotation, which occurred after Day 4 of
treatment. The large spike at approximately
0.75 days occurred because the hydrogen and
oxygen meters underwent calibration at that
time. The measured oxygen concentration
remained steady throughout treatment, and
remained below 0.4 vol%.
ANL#1174 was thoroughly examined
before and after treatment to gain a better
understanding of what changes occurred in the
barrel deposits as a result of the overall
treatment process. Figure 14 shows the inside of
the barrel prior to treatment. The material is
gray in appearance, and large chunks of material
adhere to the sides and bottom of the barrel.
There is very little loose material.
Figure 14. ANL#1174 prior to treatment
After treatment, the sodium and
carbonate material inside the barrel underwent
profound changes in appearance and
morphology. The material turned white and
became a loose, powdery, flaky material. This
material is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15. ANL#1174 after treatment with
humidified carbon dioxide.
A thorough visual inspection of the
barrel prior to the water wash step revealed that
the barrel was clean of sodium metal.
Figure 16 shows the inside of the barrel
after the water wash process. The water wash
was very successful at removing all traces of
carbonate material from inside the barrel, and
the internal metal surfaces of the barrel were
once again visible.
Figure 16. ANL#1174 after water wash
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3.6 Barrels ANL#1135 and
1116
No hydrogen was found in Barrels
ANL#1135 and 1116 with the portable hydrogen
monitor when the barrel bungs were first
opened.
Before the initial carbon dioxide purge,
the hydrogen and oxygen monitors on the vent
line were verified to be in working order, and
additional temperature probes were installed on
the outer surface of the barrels.
Barrels ANL#1135 and ANL#1116 were
purged with dry carbon dioxide one at a time,
but were treated simultaneously (in a serial
arrangement) with humidified carbon dioxide.
Due to the high temperatures encountered earlier
during the dry carbon dioxide purge step, it was
felt that it was safer to purge each barrel by
itself.
Figure 17. Barrels ANL#1135 and 1116
measured H2 and O2 concentrations during dry
CO2 purge
The sodium oxide/carbon dioxide reaction
inside both barrels was strong, and the barrel
temperatures at the bottom of the barrels peaked
at 300 and 220 ºC, respectively. The reaction
was sustained for longer than ten minutes in
Barrel ANL#1135, indicating that there was a
larger amount of sodium oxide in the barrel than
the other barrels treated. These strong
temperature peaks were accompanied by smoke
from the outside bottom of the barrels. In spite
of the smoke, the bottom of the barrels was not
visibly scorched. The measured hydrogen and
oxygen concentrations during the dry carbon
dioxide purge of these barrels are shown in
Figure 17.
The two barrels were purged
simultaneously in a serial arrangement starting
at 12/1/2004 15:06 and ending at 12/14/2004
15:30. Figure 18 shows the measured hydrogen
and oxygen concentrations during the first three
days of treatment. The figure was truncated at 3
days because no significant changes occurred in
the measured hydrogen concentration after the
first three days.
Figure 18. Barrels ANL#1135 and 1116
measured H2 and O2 concentration during
humidified CO2
The barrels were treated in an upright position
for 1.7 days, and were then placed on their sides
for further treatment. The short step increase in
the measured hydrogen concentration at Day 1.7
indicates the point where the drums were rotated
to their sides. The drums were rotated again to
the other side after about 5 days, but no change
occurred in the measured hydrogen and oxygen
concentration. Presumably all of the residual
sodium in the barrels had reacted at that point,
and none remained to cause any increase in the
hydrogen measurement.
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Figure 19 shows a photo of the inside of
Barrel ANL#1135 after completing the
humidified carbon dioxide treatment but before
it was washed in the SCMS water wash vessel.
The bottom of the barrel was free of metallic
sodium deposits, and contained almost a gallon
of loose flaky carbonate material.
Figure 19. Barrel ANL#1135 after humidified
CO2 treatment
Barrel #1116 had a similar appearance to
Barrel #1135 after treatment. Figure 20 shows
the inside of the barrel. The material at the
bottom of the barrel was loose and flaky. This
barrel also contained black flecks of the kind
seen in the bottom of ANL#82.
Both barrels emerged clean and shiny after they
were washed in the SCMS water wash vessel.
No sodium or carbonate residue remained in the
barrels after washing, and no hydrogen reactions
were observed or detected during the washing
process.
Figure 20. Barrel #1116 after humidified CO2
treatment
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Appendix -- I
APPENDIX: HAZARD ANALYSIS
The contents of this appendix were originally written into Controlled Document #F0000-0213-ES-01,
“HAZARD ANALYSIS: Fermi Barrel Treatment Using Humidified Carbon Dioxide”, and are provided
here for completeness.
Introduction
There are approximately 1400 Fermi barrels currently being stored at Argonne National
Laboratory – West. Fermi barrels are 55-gallon steel drums that contain residual amounts of sodium
metal, sodium oxides, and sodium carbonates. Originally, these barrels were filled with sodium metal
from the Fermi-I sodium-cooled reactor in Monroe, Michigan. The bulk sodium was drained from the
barrels during the EBR-II Plant Closure Project, which was active between 1999 and 2002, and the barrels
were placed into storage for eventual disposal. Although the amount of sodium metal remaining in each
barrel is below RCRA regulation limits, it still must be completely deactivated before the barrels can be
sent for disposal, because the disposal site will not accept waste materials containing sodium metal. This
hazards analysis addresses the hazards associated with the deactivation process.
The process chosen to deactivate the residual sodium inside the barrels is the humid carbon
dioxide process. With this process, a flow of humidified but not saturated carbon dioxide is established
through a single barrel, or a serial arrangement of barrels. The moisture in the carbon dioxide reacts with
the residual sodium to form sodium hydroxide and hydrogen gas. The carbon dioxide then quickly reacts
with the sodium hydroxide to form sodium bicarbonate. The hydrogen gas created by the process is
diluted by excess carbon dioxide and is vented into the environment. As a dilute vapor, water reacts with
the sodium metal in a controlled and steady fashion, so that any process instabilities caused by the build-
up of liquid water inside the drums will be avoided.
The humid carbon dioxide process for deactivating residual sodium was developed during the
EBR-II Plant Closure Project, where it was referred to as the sodium passivation process. Laboratory
tests and a large-scale demonstration of the process on the EBR-II secondary sodium system showed that
the process could be used safely and predictably to deactivate residual sodium within process equipment.
As a result, the EBR-II Plant Closure Project adopted the process as its process of choice and was used to
deactivate approximately 50 gallons (190 liters) of residual sodium within the EBR-II secondary sodium
system, and approximately 60 gallons (230 liters) of residual sodium within the EBR-II primary sodium
system. Since that time, treatment of residual sodium within the EBR-II primary tank was re-started in
May 2004, and another 60 gallons (230 liters) of residual sodium have so far been deactivated with this
process.
The principle hazards associated with the treatment process are hydrogen, sodium metal, inert
gases, pressure, hot surfaces, and low levels of radioactivity. These hazards and the mitigation strategies
to address them are discussed below.
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Applicable Documents
The safety basis for the handling of sodium within the EBR-II facility was established by the
EBR-II Hazard Summary Report (Ref. 1), a document detailing hazards and safety analyses dating back
to the initial design of the reactor. Building on this document, other documents were written to analyze
the process hazards associated with the deactivation of residual sodium within the EBR-II primary and
secondary sodium systems using humid carbon dioxide (Ref. 2, 3, 4). These analyses concluded that the
deactivation process, with its defined engineering and administrative controls, could be used safely to
deactivate residual sodium within the EBR-II primary and secondary sodium systems.
Since those analyses were written, the humid carbon dioxide process has been demonstrated to
work safely and effectively in the laboratory (Ref. 5), and in the EBR-II facility (Ref. 6).
The Fermi barrel treatment process has been examined in an engineering technical analysis (Ref.
7), and a non-routine procedure has been written to perform the initial testing of the deactivation process
(Ref. 8). The non-routine procedure will be used to optimize operational parameters and to measure data
that will be used to develop a QA/QC program for routine Fermi barrel treatment.
The hazards associated with hydrogen, sodium metal, and inert gases have already been described
and mitigation procedures developed in the previous documentation. General ANL-W approved actions
and protective equipment will be used to mitigate the hazards associated with these materials.
Program/Experiment/Test Requirements
All test procedures and requirements will be handled under the approved procedures listed in
NRP-EBR-009 (Ref. 8). This non-routine procedure will cover normal and abnormal operation of the
deactivation process. The procedure will cover mitigation measures for all of the hazards associated with
the process, including the additional hazards not covered in previous documentation, the hazards
associated with pressure and radioactive materials.
Consequences, Risk and Mitigation of Additional Hazards
There are several additional hazards that were not explicitly addressed in that documentation that
will be addressed here. These hazards are pressure, hot surfaces, and the presence of radioactive
materials.
Barrel pressurization is one possible hazard associated with the treatment process. Barrel
pressurization may cause harm to workers either by the ejection of bungs during bung removal, or by
barrel rupture due to the barrel internal pressure exceeding the burst strength of the barrel. A pressurized
barrel has stored energy that can be released suddenly in the event of an uncontrolled depressurization.
Ejection of a bung or the bursting of a drum may also release material from inside the barrel into the
environment.
Barrel pressurization may occur from the build-up of hydrogen gas within a barrel, pressure
changes due to differences between ambient pressure and static barrel pressure, or from pressurization of
a barrel during the deactivation process. Injuries or near misses due to barrel pressurization and
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subsequent ejection of barrel bungs or barrel rupture has been documented across the DOE laboratory
complex, and so such hazards must be addressed.
The following incident is provided as an example. A near-miss occurred at Rocky Flats in
August 1999, involving the ejection of a barrel top upon removal. In this incident, a worker was
removing the lid from a new, empty steel barrel that had been shipped from California. The pressure
difference between sea level and the air pressure at Rocky Flats was sufficient to launch the top of the
barrel several feet into the air. Fortunately, the worker was not injured.
In order to address the problems posed by barrel pressurization, proper personal protective
equipment (PPE) and work procedures must be adopted to provide the necessary level of protection for
workers. Workers will be instructed to inspect barrels before they open the barrel bungs for signs of
pressurization. Such signs would include bulging barrel tops or misshapen barrels. Barrels that appear to
be pressurized will be handled on a case-by-case basis with the approval of the facility manager. Upon
initial opening from drum storage, the smaller barrel bung will be opened first, and slowly, according to
the procedure used to open the barrels the first time the Fermi sodium was withdrawn from the drums at
the ANL-W Sodium Processing Facility (Ref. 9). Only non-sparking tools will be used to open barrel
bungs. Portable hydrogen detection instrumentation will be used to monitor the opening process, and if a
sufficient concentration of hydrogen is measured upon opening, the drum will be resealed and set aside
for separate treatment, on a case-by-case basis.
After examining the pressure specifications of the barrels, and taking into account the pressure
limits of the deactivation process, there is very little risk of barrel rupture due to overpressurization of a
barrel. The Fermi barrels were used to transport sodium metal from the FERMI-I reactor facility to ANL-
W. During transport, the barrels were regulated under Rule 49 CFR 178.605 (Ref. 10), which requires
that drums or barrels used to transport materials falling into Packing Group I, in which sodium metal is
included, must be able to handle up to 250 kPa (approximately 36 psig) overpressure without damage.
Since it is presumed that the Fermi sodium was shipped lawfully to ANL-W, the Fermi barrels must
conform to the rule and must be able to handle up to 36 psig without a problem. The pressure of the
deactivation process is limited to a maximum pressure of 11 psig (76 kPa-g) by a pressure regulator and a
relief valve (Ref. 11), and so barrel pressures during the treatment process will not approach that
maximum limit. To help reduce pressure drop and the risk of a vent line blockage occurring, only ”
tubing will be used, which provides a wider diameter flow channel than standard ” or ” tubing.
Though the barrels should be able to sustain up to 36 psig without any danger of rupture or
deformation, it is possible that individual barrels may be weakened in spots due to corrosion. The barrels
have been in storage for many years, and it is possible that weak spots may have developed. Weak spots
would reduce the pressure tolerance of the barrel and would increase the likelihood of a hole opening in
the barrel upon pressurization. As a first step, barrels will be visually inspected for obvious signs of
corrosion (e.g., flaked paint, large visible rust spots, etc.) before placing them in the barrel train, and set
aside if the corrosion is significant. As a second step, a steel catch pan will be placed beneath each barrel
during treatment to catch any material that may be ejected from the barrel if a weak spot gives way during
the deactivation process. Portable carbon dioxide monitors will be in place during treatment to detect any
localized increases in carbon dioxide, so that any gas leaks occurring from process piping or from a
breached barrel can be quickly detected and handled.
During the course of treatment, it could be speculated that there would be a sudden pressurization
of a barrel due to a runaway water/sodium reaction within a barrel, but past operating experience with the
deactivation process indicates that no such reactions will occur. All operating experience to date shows
that the process behaves in a steady manner with no uncontrolled excursions in pressure and temperature.
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Therefore, there is no credible risk of drum rupture due to a sudden runaway sodium reaction under
normal operating conditions. The operating performance of the humid carbon dioxide treatment is in
contrast with the performance of the steam-nitrogen process as applied to the S1G sodium tank. In that
situation, the S1G sodium tank was subject to occasional pressure and temperature spikes that, if
experienced in the Fermi barrels, may lead to barrel damage.
Similarly, no problems should be encountered from rupture of the Tygon
®
tubing used to connect
various pieces of equipment in the drum chain. Tygon
®
tubing has a burst pressure limit of 110 psig (760
kPa-g). With a maximum system pressure of less than 11 psig, there will be no credible risk of bursting
the Tygon
®
tubes.
Another hazard associated with Fermi barrel treatment is the presence of hot surfaces. The
chemical reactions involved in the deactivation process are exothermic, and it is very likely that the barrel
surfaces near sodium deposits will become hot from the heat of reaction. Workers will be required to
wear gloves when touching the barrels during the deactivation process to protect against burns.
The other possible hazard associated with deactivation of the Fermi barrels is the radioactivity of
the residual sodium, mainly due to
22
Na,
90
Sr, and
137
Cs. In 1985, the measured levels of radioactivity of
these components in the Fermi sodium were 0.82, 0.36, and 0.73 nCi/g (30, 13, 27 Bq/g), respectively
(Ref. 12). At the time of Fermi drum deactivation, the activity levels will have decayed to below 0.0052
nCi/g, 0.23 nCi/g, and 0.47 nCi/g (0.19, 8.5, 17 Bq/g). These activity levels are very low, but precautions
still must be taken when there is risk of contacting the material, or when there is a possibility of releasing
the material into the environment.
The total amount of radioactivity that can be released to the environment is limited by the amount
of sodium in each barrel. All of the Fermi barrels have already been drained of bulk sodium and contain
less than 5 lbs of sodium per barrel. Therefore, the total amount of radioactivity that could potentially be
released at any one time is less than 1.6 μCi (5.9 x 104 Bq) per barrel.
To protect against any releases of radioactive material through the vent line, the vent line will be
equipped with a HEPA filter. The HEPA filter will be DOP tested or replaced on an annual basis in order
to comply with existing rules and regulations.
Proper personal protective equipment will be used by workers whenever handling or inspecting
barrels, and proper procedures used to handle barrels will be described in the operating procedure
documentation. Specialized procedures will be written to handle barrel inspection for the purposes of
verifying that all of the residual sodium has been reacted, so that the risk of worker exposure to the
radioactive material is minimized.
Conclusions
The hazards presented by the presence of hydrogen, sodium metal, pressure, hot surfaces, and
radioactivity do no present any additional hazards to workers or to the facility, and do not affect our
ability to maintain a safe and acceptable risk posture. The risks due to these hazards are minimized
through engineering and behavioral controls, and the deactivation process can be performed safely.
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ADDENDUM:
Hazard Analysis of Fermi Barrel
Pre-Treatment With Dry Carbon Dioxide
Introduction
Prior to treatment, the Fermi barrels contain a mixture of residual sodium metal, sodium oxide,
sodium hydroxide, and sodium carbonate species. The components are not uniformly mixed, and the
materials are believed to be divided in layers, with sodium at the deepest parts, and hydroxides, oxides
and carbonate layers covering it.
Figure 1: Inside of Fermi Barrel #ANL1174 prior to treatment
As seen in Figure 1, the material inside the Fermi barrel is lumpy and adheres to the walls and the bottom.
The residual sodium in the barrel is not visible due to the presence of oxide, hydroxide, and carbonate
layers. Such materials are believed to originate from years of air and water vapor in-leakage into the
barrels. Such findings may also suggest that there is little chance of pressure build-up in the Fermi barrels
prior to treatment, since there seems to be an open pathway for air and water vapor to leak into the
barrels, and for hydrogen to leak out of the barrels as it is created.
At the start of the residual sodium treatment process, the Fermi barrels are purged with dry
carbon dioxide. During the past application of this treatment technique to clean residual sodium (metal
visible or covered with a very thin oxide coating), the dry carbon dioxide was inert and showed no
evidence of reacting in any way with the residual sodium.
Unlike clean residual sodium, the material in the Fermi barrels has proved to behave very
differently in regard to its reactivity with dry carbon dioxide. Upon introduction of carbon dioxide into
the Fermi barrels (as observed in Fermi Barrels #ANL630, ANL1128, ANL1174, ANL1135, and
ANL1116), chemical reactions are occurring that generate heat, hydrogen, and perhaps a small amount of
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oxygen. The chemical reactions occur quickly, with little induction time, and then subside, usually within
15 minutes after the introduction of carbon dioxide.
The temperature of each barrel was measured at 6 different spatial points during the carbon
dioxide purge, and the highest readings were observed on the bottom of the barrel. The measured
temperatures varied from barrel to barrel, and peak temperatures reached between 40 and 300 °C. The
temperature of the barrels at the top, where the Tygon tubing attaches to the outlet, was observed to climb
as high as 50 °C. For several of the barrels purged, the high temperatures caused the bottom of the barrels
to smoke. In one barrel, the smoke was accompanied by a discoloration of the barrel bottom.
During peak reaction times, the measured hydrogen concentration rose to about 5-6 vol% (with a
CO2 input rate of 5 scfm or 134 slm). Oxygen may also have been generated. Due to the way the exhaust
manifold is plumbed and the relatively slow response time of the oxygen meter, it was difficult to get an
accurate reading of the oxygen concentration in the exhaust gas. The exhaust manifold suffers from air
in-leakage when the system is not actively being purged and the oxygen meter reads high until gas flow is
established through the barrel(s). Even so, the measured oxygen concentration tends to remain around 1
vol% until the chemical reactions subside, and then it drops down to baseline levels (less than 0.4 vol% at
the exhaust manifold).
There are several safety questions that must be addressed in response to this chemical reaction
that haven’t been dealt with already in previous safety or hazard analyses. These are:
• Why is dry carbon dioxide reacting with the residual content in the Fermi barrels, and,
with the small amount of hydrogen generated, does this present an immediate fire hazard
within the barrels during the dry carbon dioxide purge?
• Is there a potential hazard associated with the approximate 1400 barrels in storage in
regard to these chemical reactions?
• The chemical reactions generate a substantial amount of heat, which sometimes causes
the bottom of the barrels to smoke. Does this heat present any external safety hazards?
• What mitigation strategies might be employed to lessen the hazards associated with the
above activities?
This addendum will address these questions, and will propose methods for mitigating or reducing the
hazards associated with the use of dry carbon dioxide during the purge of the Fermi barrels.
Carbon Dioxide Reactions and Analysis of Immediate Internal Hazards
There are multiple chemical reactions that are occurring in the barrels upon CO2 exposure.
Almost all of the chemical reactions are exothermic (generating thermal energy), but only certain
reactions are giving rise to the generation of hydrogen and perhaps oxygen. For this analysis, these
chemical reactions are divided into three categories: initiating reactions, hydrogen generation steps, and
side reactions. All thermodynamic data provided below was obtained from Ref. 13.
Initiating Reactions
The initiating reactions that occur in Fermi barrels in regard to carbon dioxide that do not appear
to occur with any significant impact with “clean” sodium are the reactions of carbon dioxide with sodium
oxide and sodium peroxide. These reactions are shown in Equations 1 and 2.
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Na2O s( ) +  CO2 g( )   Na2CO3 s( ) Hro = 321.5 kJ/mol (1)
Na2O2 s( ) +  CO2 g( )   Na2CO3 s( ) + 12 O2 g( ) Hro = 232.8 kJ/mol (2)
In Equation 1, carbon dioxide reacts with sodium oxide to produce sodium carbonate. In Equation 2,
carbon dioxide reacts with sodium peroxide to produce sodium carbonate and oxygen. Both reactions are
strongly exothermic.
Sodium oxide and perhaps a small amount of sodium peroxide are believed to be in the barrels
prior to the start of the treatment process by reason of logical and chemical arguments. Air in-leakage has
certainly occurred over the lifetime of the Fermi barrels, resulting in the exposure of the residual sodium
to oxygen. Oxygen reacts readily with sodium metal to form sodium oxide, with sodium oxide being the
most stable oxide species at room temperature. Sodium peroxide can be formed by heating sodium oxide
in the presence of oxygen to temperatures in the range of 200-300 °C (Ref. 14). The Fermi barrels are
stored at ambient temperature, but the past history of the barrels is uncertain, and it is possible that such
conditions could have been experienced some time in the past. Unlike potassium, sodium does not form
super oxides at ambient conditions and at normal atmospheric pressures (Ref. 15).
Chemical samples taken after full treatment of Barrel #ANL630 were analyzed, and were
determined to have a composition of approximately 30 wt% sodium carbonate, with the balance being
sodium bicarbonate. If sodium oxide were not present in the drums prior to starting treatment, then the
composition of the post-treatment powder would have contained less than 5 wt% sodium carbonate, as
was seen in samples taken from laboratory experiments and the EBR-II Secondary Sodium System after
treatment with humid carbon dioxide (Ref. 16). No samples have yet been taken from the Fermi barrels
prior to treatment, and so no definite confirmation of this hypothesis can yet be provided.
Hydrogen Generation Steps
Equations 1 and 2 above provide an explanation for the large amount of heat and the suspected
amounts of oxygen generated by exposing the residual Fermi material to carbon dioxide, but they do not
explain the development of a significant amount of hydrogen during the reaction. Hydrogen can only be
generated by exposing sodium metal to water, as shown in Equation 3.
H2O g or l( ) +  Na s( )   NaOH(s) + 12 H2 g( ) Hro = 184.9 kJ/mol (3)
Since there is no water vapor in the dry carbon dioxide that was introduced into the Fermi barrels,
the water must already be present in the barrel, but in a form that was not available until the initiating
reactions occurred. It is speculated that the water is being held inside the barrels in the form of sodium
carbonate hydrates. Sodium carbonate has a high capacity for storing water under the right humidity
conditions, and has the capacity to release it upon modest temperature increases. Equation 4 shows the
prototypical reaction associated with the decomposition of sodium carbonate hydrate.
Na2CO3 • H2O( )x s( )   Na2CO3 • H2O( )x-y +  y H2O g( ) Hro = +57 to 472 kJ/mol (4)
In Equation 4, x may have a value of 10, 7, or 1. And the decomposition reactions occur at 25, 32, and
100 °C, respectively. Though these reactions are endothermic, the initial reactions of carbon dioxide with
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sodium oxide and sodium peroxide would liberate more than enough thermal energy to provide heat to
these endothermic decomposition reactions.
Water may also be liberated from the decomposition of another sodium carbonate hydrate form,
sodium sesquicarbonate, as shown in Equation 5. This reaction occurs above 70 °C.
Na2CO3 •NaHCO3 • H2O( )2   Na2CO3 +  NaHCO3 +  2 H2O g( ) Hro = +32 kJ/mol (5)
Lastly, water may also be released from sodium hydroxide species. Since the material in the
barrels is dry, it is not likely that there are sodium hydroxide hydrate species beyond sodium hydroxide
monohydrate, which begins to lose water above 60 °C. This reaction is shown in Equation 6.
NaOH•H2O s( )   NaOH s( ) +  H2O g( ) Hro = +64.35 kJ/mol (6)
Given the uncertain history of the barrels (long-term storage in an uncontrolled environment), it is
very likely that the water source for the sodium-water reaction that is responsible for the hydrogen is
sodium carbonate hydrates and perhaps sodium hydroxide monohydrate. Without taking samples of the
starting materials, it is difficult to know the specific species involved. From a safety standpoint, knowing
which specific species are involved will have little effect on how the drums are treated, and it is enough to
know that they are very likely present in the barrels and that the treatment procedures must be adjusted in
response.
Side Reactions
There are other chemical reactions that release heat and may contribute to the high temperatures
measured in the barrels. One reaction is the combination of carbon dioxide with sodium hydroxide, as
shown in Equation 7.
CO2 g( ) +  NaOH s( )   NaHCO3(s) Hro = 127.4 kJ/mol (7)
The sodium hydroxide may already be present in layers close to the sodium surfaces, or may have been
created by the water/sodium reaction shown in Equation 3.
Water vapor may also react with sodium oxide or sodium peroxide to liberate some thermal
energy, though the reactions are less energetic than water-sodium metal reactions. These reactions are
shown in Equations 8 and 9.
H2O g( ) +  Na2O s( )   2 NaOH(s) Hro = 46.8 kJ/mol (8)
H2O g( ) +  Na2O2 s( )   2 NaOH(s) + 12  O2 g( ) Hro = 25.6 kJ/mol (9)
Analysis of Immediate Internal Hazards
The immediate hazard present due to these reactions is the evolution of heat. While the heat itself
does not present any internal hazard, it may have an effect on the Tygon
®
tubing used to carry the exhaust
gas to the vent, and may serve as a trigger for a hydrogen/oxygen reaction, if other reaction conditions are
favorable (e.g., sufficiently high oxygen levels).
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The measured hydrogen levels emerging from the Fermi barrels have been in the range of 5-6
vol%. If oxygen were present at concentrations above 5 vol%, then this hydrogen concentration would be
in the flammable range. The measured oxygen concentrations were no higher than about 1.2 vol%, and so
there is no immediate danger of hydrogen combustion within the barrel(s) during the purge.
The highest measured temperature at the tops of the barrels adjacent to the gas outlet during the
dry carbon dioxide purge was about 50 °C. The recommended temperature limit of Tygon
®
tubing is 74
°C, above which it loses its strength and can sag, stretch, or otherwise lose its shape. Even at 50 °C, the
tubing becomes somewhat more flexible and can sag and pinch. Care must be taken to avoid kinking or
collapsing the tubing so that the barrel does not become pressurized or un-vented during the purge. The
tubing should be positioned properly or supported during the purging period to avoid closing off the
exhaust line. As an added precaution, it is suggested that a short section of metal-braided tubing be
attached to the drum bung, to which the Tygon
®
tubing can be attached. The metal-braided tubing would
help vent some of the heat from the exhaust gases prior to flowing through the Tygon
®
tubing. Metal-
braided tubing would not kink. Alternatively, if available in larger diameters, the Tygon
®
tubing could be
replaced with Teflon
®
tubing, which has a higher temperature tolerance.
Also, with the high exhaust temperature, it is recommended that a serial arrangement of barrels be
avoided if more than one barrel is being with purged pure carbon dioxide at the same time. In a serial
arrangement, the gas exhausted from one barrel becomes the inlet gas for the following barrel. With the
high heat generated in the leading barrel, the second barrel in series would experience still higher
temperatures, and so on down the line until the exhaust temperatures exceed the temperature limit of the
Tygon
®
tubing and it collapses. In addition, the hydrogen concentration in the gas stream would be
amplified in each successive barrel, so that a more hazardous condition is created further down the serial
chain than would have been present with just one barrel.
A parallel arrangement is perhaps the better way to approach the problem of purging more than
one barrel at a time under the current purging conditions. Exhaust gas temperatures would stay below the
temperature limit of the Tygon
®
tubing, and hydrogen and oxygen concentrations would not be amplified.
The overall flow rate of carbon dioxide would need to be increased, however, to keep the gas flow rates
through each barrel similar to the flow rate used to purge just one barrel at a time.
During the purge period, carbon dioxide is supplied to the barrel in excess, so that the
consumption of carbon dioxide within the barrel is much less than the flow rate of carbon dioxide through
the barrel. This excess flow serves to dilute the hydrogen and oxygen generated during the purge process,
and helps to remove excess heat energy. If the flow of carbon dioxide were stopped to the barrel during
the purge, it is speculated that the carbon dioxide already within the barrel could be quickly used up,
resulting in a negative pressure in the barrel and a relative increase in the concentrations of hydrogen and
oxygen. A negative pressure may also cause the backflow of gas from the vent line or air in-leakage
through the bung threads. Such conditions may lead to an increased fire hazard. Also, the negative
pressure may buckle the barrel and make further treatment more difficult. As the barrel treatment process
stands now, operators will have to resist the temptation to reduce the flow of carbon dioxide to the barrel
when the purge operation is underway in response to high barrel temperatures, and will have to maintain
maximum carbon dioxide flow rates during the purge to minimize the risk of a hydrogen ignition.
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Fermi Barrel Storage Hazards
The question has been asked whether there is a potential hazard in the way the Fermi barrels are
stored on-site. Currently, the Fermi barrels are stored in unheated storage containers. Could the high
temperatures and hydrogen evolution witnessed during the carbon dioxide purge step occur in any of the
stored Fermi barrels as a result of changing environmental conditions, especially on hot summer days?
Under such circumstances, the principle hazards would be the generation of hydrogen and the
development of excess barrel pressure, which could potentially lead to hydrogen leaks and the
development of a potentially hazardous atmosphere inside a barrel storage unit.
For hydrogen to evolve, the water stored in the form of hydrates would need to be released, and
then react with residual sodium metal. For a significant hazard to exist, oxygen and heat would also need
to be present in sufficient amounts to push the hydrogen into the flammable zone and then initiate a
hydrogen/oxygen reaction. The initiating chemical reactions in these circumstances would be the direct
decomposition of the hydrate species in response to increased environmental temperatures, as opposed to
the triggering conditions caused by the reaction of carbon dioxide with sodium oxide and sodium
peroxide. Hydrogen and heat could also be evolved from the direct in-leakage of liquid water, but such
an event is extremely unlikely as long as the barrels are stored in closed storage containers, the storage
containers are kept on dry ground, and the barrel bungs are on tight.
There are several factors that make the creation of hazardous conditions inside a barrel very
unlikely during storage, even on hot summer days. First, air in-leakage past the barrel bungs is unlikely
to lead to the creation of an oxygen-rich environment. As evidenced by the build-up of oxides and
carbonate materials in Figure 1, sodium metal is a very good getter of oxygen. As air leaks into the
barrels, the oxygen is consumed to form sodium oxide and sodium peroxide, leaving the nitrogen. Even
with a continuous leak, oxygen will continue to become consumed until the oxide layers are so thick that
oxygen cannot reach the sodium metal underneath. At that point, an air atmosphere may develop in the
barrel, but the sodium metal is not readily available for further chemical reactions and is protected against
reactions with water vapor.
Second, the sodium carbonate species that presumably exist in the surface layers decompose
endothermically. That is, thermal energy must be supplied to power the decomposition reactions. As a
result, the decomposition reactions will tend to suppress the temperature of the material as they
decompose, helping to lower the temperature and slow down the decomposition reactions. With up to ten
moles of water released for every mole of sodium carbonate hydrate decomposed, this effect, however,
may be a small one.
Third, due to the presence of deep layers of sodium oxide (and perhaps sodium hydroxide)
coating the residual sodium, it is relatively unlikely that the water released by the decomposition of the
hydrates will come into contact with residual sodium. The oxide layers are not just a resistive barrier, but
also a reactive one, and will consume water before it reaches the sodium surfaces (see Equations 8 and 9).
Such chemical reactions will release heat but will not generate hydrogen.
So, given these factors, it is very unlikely that a hydrogen combustion event will occur in the
Fermi barrels as a result of environmental changes during storage.
If all of these factors work against the generation of hydrogen while the barrels are in storage,
how is it that hydrogen is so readily generated during the dry carbon dioxide purge step? There is much
more sodium oxide and sodium peroxide present than sodium carbonate, and so much more heat is
generated during the purge step than can be generated by the release of water from the hydrates and its
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subsequent reaction with other chemical species in the barrel. According to the measured hydrogen
readings from the treatment of the first six barrels, only about 18 to 36 grams of water reacted with
residual sodium in each barrel to form hydrogen during the purge step, or about 1 to 2 moles of water.
Such small amounts of water reacting with sodium would not be enough to raise the temperature of the
barrels up to the high temperatures witnessed during the purge step. The conversion of sodium oxide to
sodium carbonate is very energetic (almost twice as energetic as the sodium/water reaction), and given the
unlimited supply of carbon dioxide in the barrel atmosphere, would provide enough heat energy to release
all of the stored water very quickly.
The conversion of sodium oxide to sodium carbonate also causes large volume changes in the
surface layers, such that the protective surface covering the residual sodium would be disrupted. The
molar volumes of sodium oxide, sodium hydroxide, and sodium carbonate are 27.3, 18.7, and 41.9
cm
3
/mole, respectively. While the reaction of a small amount of water with a large amount of sodium
oxide is not likely to significantly disrupt the surface layers covering all of the residual sodium in the case
of stored barrels, the protective surface layers are significantly more disrupted by the complete conversion
of all sodium oxide into sodium carbonate, which has a volume expansion factor of at least 1.53 (see
Equations 1 and 2). It is believed that this surface layer disruption, coupled with the rapid release of
stored water, is giving rise to the measured hydrogen readings, by allowing the released water vapor to
react directly with unprotected residual sodium. Figure 2 shows an example of how much the larger
clumps and particles inside a Fermi barrel can be disrupted by changes in molar volume.
Figure 2: Inside of Fermi Barrel #ANL1174 after treatment
The material shown in Figure 2 is approximately 70 wt% sodium bicarbonate, with the balance being
sodium carbonate. It is not the same transformation that is discussed above, but it does show that the
material in the drum eventually disintegrated into a powder, largely due to molar volume changes in the
material and an increase in material porosity.
Without a significant source of carbon dioxide, the initiating reactions that occur rapidly during
the dry carbon dioxide purge would not happen, and the response of the drums to environmental
temperature changes would be moot. Therefore, there is no perceived risk in the way the Fermi barrels
are currently stored.
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Analysis of External Hazards
The Fermi barrel surfaces can get quite hot and are a hazard to workers. Workers should use
gloves whenever handling the hot barrels, and should refrain from contacting the barrels during the peak
reaction period.
Of the six barrels treated so far with dry carbon dioxide, four got hot enough on the bottom of the
barrels to smoke. In one case, the smoke was thick enough to cause a haze to build up in the upper levels
of the Sodium Boiler Building. No flames were observed. Scorching was evident on the bottom of barrel
#ANL1116, but the other barrels showed no sign of scorching or changes in the barrel paint.
As a precaution, all combustible materials should be kept away from the barrel surfaces during
the purge step. A fire watch should be designated for the duration of the purge step, and an all-purpose
fire extinguisher made available to the fire watch.
Hazard Mitigation Strategies
The real sources of the hazards associated with the dry carbon dioxide purge are the chemical
reactions of carbon dioxide with sodium oxide and presumably sodium peroxide. These hazards occur
because the supply of carbon dioxide is unlimited, and the reactions, once started, cannot be safely
stopped without creating additional hazards. The only thing limiting the reaction rate at the sodium oxide
surfaces is the diffusion rate of carbon dioxide through the sodium carbonate surface layers. As a result,
operators must wait for the chemical reactions to finish before terminating the dry carbon dioxide purge.
The dry carbon dioxide purge can be made safer by making the supply of carbon dioxide the
limiting factor, rather than allowing the reaction rates to be controlled at the oxide layer surfaces. This
can be accomplished by down-blending the carbon dioxide with an inert gas such as nitrogen or argon.
With carbon dioxide as the limiting reactant, the reaction rate can be slowed down and controlled by
adjusting the concentration of carbon dioxide in the inlet gas. Slowing down the reaction rate will reduce
the temperature of the barrels during the purge and will allow more time for the evolved thermal energy to
dissipate.
With independent controls on the flow of inert gas and carbon dioxide, the chemical reactions
may be started and stopped at will. To increase the reaction rate, increase the flow of carbon dioxide, and
to decrease or stop the chemical reactions, slow or stop the flow of carbon dioxide while maintaining the
flow of the inert gas. This adds an element of control that is not present in the current purge process, and
would allow the operator to stop the purge altogether at any time, if safety or operational conditions
dictate.
Under a carbon dioxide-limited condition, the barrels being purged could be arranged in a serial
fashion, just as the barrels are arranged for the humid carbon dioxide treatment step. The problems of
increasing heat load and amplification of hydrogen and oxygen concentrations are not present under
carbon dioxide-limited conditions, because the supply of carbon dioxide limits the amount of heat
generated throughout the serial chain, and indirectly limits the evolution of hydrogen by limiting the
temperature increases. The presence of the inert gas also dilutes any hydrogen or oxygen generated and
thus significantly reduces the chances of creating a combustible atmosphere inside the barrels.
As an added precaution, to help prevent the backflow of air into the barrels during the dry carbon
dioxide purge, the use of a check valve or back-pressure regulating device should be investigated for use
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on the exhaust line. Although a negative effect of preventing backflow may be the partial collapse of a
barrel, such a collapse is more of a treatment risk than a safety risk. Given the choice between a partial
collapse of a barrel due to a negative pressure, and the backflow of air into a hot drum, the partial collapse
of a drum is preferred. Under negative pressure conditions, the check valve or back-pressure regulating
device would close, and limit the flow of gas from the vent line back into the barrels being treated.
Installation of such a device should be considered if the pressure drop created by the fitting does not
significantly impact the treatment operation.
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